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Health Insurance and Retirement of Married Couples
Abstract
In this study we propose a new explanation for the fact that labor force participation of older
married couples is strongly positively correlated, and we develop and estimate a model that allows
us to determine its importance. Our explanation is based on the observations that (1) most health
insurance is provided by employers until eligibility for Medicare begins at age 65, (2) many
individuals are covered by health insurance from the spouse’s employer, and (3) there is
substantial variation across employer health insurance plans in coverage for retirees and the
spouses of retirees. Descriptive evidence shows that couples who face employment incentives
arising from shared health insurance appear to respond strongly to those incentives. We build a
dynamic behavioral model of the employment and medical care decisions of older couples. The
model places no restrictions on either the degree of complementarity of leisure hours of spouses in
utility or the value of health insurance (i.e., risk aversion): these two key aspects of behavior are
determined by parameters identified by variation in health risk and health insurance constraints
and the behavior of couples in response to these constraints. Estimates of the model therefore
allow us to determine the empirical importance of the explanation we propose. Estimates of the
model using data from the Health and Retirement Survey indicate that couples have a strong
preference for shared leisure and a relatively low degree of risk-aversion. The risk-reducing





The labor force status and transitions of older husbands and wives are strongly positively
correlated. An older individual is much more likely to be employed if the individual’s spouse is
employed than if the spouse is not employed. An employed individual is much more likely to exit
employment if the spouse is not employed than if the spouse is employed. These patterns have
been documented in a number of countries and time periods, but the causes are not well-
understood. The desire of spouses to share leisure time during retirement must be part of the
explanation. Financial incentives could reinforce or offset behavior induced by complementarity of
leisure. For example, husbands and wives who are close in age will reach the age of eligibility for
Social Security benefits at around the same time, and therefore may face similar retirement
incentives from Social Security. Jointly held private assets could have positive wealth effects on
the demand for leisure of both spouses. However, if the private pension plans of the spouses have
different early and normal retirement ages, pension incentives could induce one spouse to stay
employed longer than the other. Also, a substantial disparity in wage rates could lead to incentives
for one spouse to be employed while the other is not.
Previous research has found little evidence that financial incentives can explain the
variation in joint labor force behavior of married couples. While many couples closely coordinate
the timing of exit from employment, equally large numbers of couples do not. This variation has
not been well-explained in studies that have incorporated measures of financial incentives. For
example, Hurd (1990, p. 253) concludes that “cross-[spouse] economic variables do not have a
strong effect on retirement ages, so they do not provide a good explanation for the correlation of
retirement dates.” Blau (1997, 1998) finds that the Social Security spouse benefit has small effects
1See Baker (1999), Blau and Riphahn (1999) and Gustman and Steinmeier (2000) for
related evidence.
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on the timing of retirement and that cross-spouse wage effects are small as well.1 It is important to
understand the sources of variation in the joint labor force behavior of older couples. Any policy
that affects the retirement decisions of an individual by altering retirement incentives could also
affect the retirement behavior of the spouse. 
In this study we propose a new explanation for the variation in joint labor force behavior
of older couples, and we develop and estimate a model that allows us to determine its importance.
Our explanation is based on the observations that (1) most health insurance in the United States is
provided by employers until eligibility for Medicare (public health insurance for the elderly and
disabled) begins at age 65; (2) many individuals are covered by health insurance from the spouse’s
employer; and (3) there is substantial variation across employer health insurance plans in coverage
for retirees and the spouses of retirees. To illustrate, consider two hypothetical couples with the
same preferences and constraints except for health insurance, and assume that the husband is two
years older than the wife. Suppose that the husband and wife are both employed when the
husband is age 62 and the wife age 60, and that the wife’s employer does not provide health
insurance. The husband in couple A has health insurance from his employer that covers retired as
well as active workers and their spouses. In couple B, the husband’s health insurance does not
cover retired workers or spouses. Couple A does not face any incentives from health insurance
that affect the timing of retirement. Coverage of both spouses continues regardless of the
employment status of either spouse. In couple B, the health insurance coverage of both spouses
depends on the husband’s but not the wife’s employment status until he reaches age 65 and
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becomes eligible for Medicare. At that point the wife’s coverage but not the husband’s depends
on his employment status. If spouses have a strong desire for shared leisure, it seems likely that in
couple A they would closely coordinate their labor force exit timing. In couple B, however, the
husband has an incentive to remain employed until he is 67 in order to ensure health insurance
coverage for his wife until she turns 65. But her employment decision has no impact on her health
insurance coverage. She could remain employed herself and wait until age 65 to retire, but other
incentives could induce her to retire earlier (poor health, low wage, a private pension plan). Thus
if health insurance coverage is valuable to older couples, such considerations could help explain
variation across couples in the degree of labor force coordination.
In section 2 we describe the association between joint labor force behavior of older
couples and their health insurance coverage, using data from the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS). These data reveal that couples who face employment incentives arising from shared health
insurance appear to respond to those incentives. For example, a wife whose husband’s health
insurance coverage depends on her remaining employed is much more likely to be employed than
is a wife whose husband has health insurance coverage that is independent of her employment
status.  This demonstrates the potential usefulness of an explanation of variation in the joint labor
force behavior of older couples based on health insurance coverage. 
In section 3 we describe a dynamic behavioral model of the employment and medical care
decisions of older couples that can be estimated empirically. The model places no restrictions on
either the degree of complementarity of leisure hours in utility or the degree of risk aversion: these
two key aspects of behavior are determined by parameters identified by variation in health risk and
health insurance constraints and the behavior of couples in response to these constraints.
2See Berkovec and Stern (1991), Blau and Gilleskie (2001a), Rust and Phelan (1997), and
Stock and Wise (1990) for other dynamic stochastic models of retirement.
4
Estimates of the model therefore allow us to determine the empirical importance of the
explanation we propose.2
Section 4 describes the HRS data that we use to estimate the model. These data include
extensive information on health insurance and pensions collected from the current and former
employers of the couples in our sample to supplement the information provided by the
respondents. We also use the Social Security earnings records of the sample members in order to
provide accurate measures of retirement incentives. 
Section 5 presents estimates of the model and simulations of behavior generated from the
estimated model. The model fits the observed employment choices well in many dimensions, but
does not do a good job of capturing differences in employment choices by health insurance
conditional on previous employment status. Health insurance enters the model only through the
budget constraint, so this suggests that the risk-reducing feature of health insurance may not be
the driving factor behind observed differences in employment choices by health insurance.
Couples may value health insurance for other reasons not captured in our model. Consistent with
this interpretation, the estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion is 1.10, substantially lower
than the values often used in simulation studies of savings. In our analysis, this coefficient is
identified by variation across individuals in health risk interacted with health insurance, and the
estimate suggests that people are not as averse to the consequences of health risk as they are often
assumed to be with respect to earnings and other risks. Section 6 concludes.
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2. Descriptive Overview
The HRS sampled men and women aged 51-61 in 1992 and their spouses, and has
interviewed them every two years since 1992. In this section we describe the relationships among
employment status, defined by whether an individual is employed at the survey date in 1992 and
1994, employment transitions between the 1992 and 1994 survey dates, and health insurance
coverage. We classify individuals into the following health insurance coverage categories: (1)
covered by a current or former employer that provides retiree health insurance (RHI); (2) covered
by a current employer that does not provide RHI; (3) covered by the spouse’s current or former
employer that provides RHI for which the individual is eligible; (4) covered by the spouse’s
current employer that does not provide RHI for which the individual is eligible. Here we include
individuals only if their health insurance coverage falls into one of these four categories and they
have no other source of coverage. These restrictions are relaxed in the following sections.
Table 1 shows the employment status of each spouse conditional on the employment
status of the other spouse. Wives are 13.9 percentage points more likely to be employed in 1992 if
the husband is employed than if he is not employed, and 18.8 points more likely in 1994.
Husbands are 10.6 percentage points more likely to be employed in 1992  if the wife is employed
than if she is not employed, and 16.6 points more likely in 1994. Wives are 8.7 percentage points
more likely to exit employment between 1992 and 1994 if the husband also exits during the period
than if he remains employed, and they are 4.6 percentage points more likely to exit employment if
he was not employed at the beginning of the period and remained not employed than if he was
employed at both the beginning and end of the period. A husband’s employment transitions are
also strongly dependent on his wife’s employment behavior: he is 10.8 percentage points more
3See Baker (1999); Blau (1998); Blau and Riphahn (1999); Hurd (1990); Gustman and
Steinmeier (2000); Zweimüller, Winter-Ebmer, and Falkinger (1996).
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likely to exit employment if his wife also exits employment than if she remains employed, and is
7.8 percentage points more likely to exit employment if she remains non-employed than if she
remains employed. The patterns shown in Table 1 are quite similar to those described in other
data sources.3
Table 2 classifies couples by the husband’s health insurance status in the upper panel and
by the wife’s health insurance status in the lower panel. Comparing husbands with coverage from
their own employer with and without retiree coverage (upper panel, columns 1-3) shows that
husbands with retiree coverage are 16 percentage points less likely to be employed in 1992 or
1994 (rows 1-2), and conditional on being employed in 1992 are one percentage point more likely
to exit employment by 1994 (row 5). We and others have previously documented such patterns
for men (Blau and Gilleskie, 2001b; Madrian, 1994), and interpreted them as evidence that
absence of retiree health insurance is a strong deterrent to labor force exit before the age of 65. A
similar pattern appears in the lower panel for wives, with employment level effects that are not
quite as large as for men, and employment transition effects that are slightly larger than for men
(lower panel, columns 1-3, rows 3-4 and 6). 
The new information in Table 2 is in columns 4 to 6. These show that a wife whose
husband would lose his health insurance coverage if she left employment is 8.5-10.7 percentage
points more likely to be employed than a wife whose husband would not lose his coverage if she
left employment (upper panel, columns 4-6, rows 3-4), and that the former wife has a biannual
exit rate from employment 3.1 percentage points lower than the latter wife (row 6). Similarly, a
4Madrian and Beaulieu (1998) compare the retirement decisions of married men who have
a spouse 65 or older with those of men with younger spouses, in order to estimate the impact of
Medicare eligibility on retirement. Using data from the 1980 and 1990 Censuses, they find that
men aged 55-69 who worked in the previous calendar year are more likely to be retired at the
census date if the spouse is Medicare-eligible than if she is not Medicare-eligible. This is
consistent with our findings reported in Table 2, but is not directly comparable.
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husband whose wife would lose coverage if he left employment is 19.8-22.3 percentage points
more likely to be employed than a husband whose wife would not lose her coverage if he left
employment (lower panel, columns 4-6, rows 1-2), although the former husband has an annual
employment exit rate slightly higher than the latter husband (row 5). These findings suggest that
interrelationships among health insurance and employment of spouses could be important,
although they do not account for other factors that could be associated with both employment and
health insurance.4
3. The Model and Estimation
The key features of the model are that health insurance can help couples smooth the
marginal utility of consumption across health outcomes, and health insurance is linked to
employment for many couples. An adverse health shock could increase the marginal utility of
medical care. There is no saving in the model, so the only way to finance medical expenditures is
to reduce consumption in the period in which the expenditures are incurred. Uninsured health risk
reduces expected life time utility because it increases consumption variability, which risk-averse
consumers dislike in standard life cycle models. Health insurance helps smooth consumption by
reducing consumption in good health states via the insurance premium, and increasing
consumption in bad health states via coverage of medical expenses. Because health insurance
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coverage is valuable to risk averse consumers, a worker whose own or spouse’s insurance
coverage is tied to his employment status (because coverage for retirees is not offered) may make
different employment decisions than an otherwise similar worker whose insurance coverage is
independent of his employment status. If couples are highly risk-averse, then these differences
could be substantial.
Two key assumptions that are imposed for computational feasibility are that there is no
saving and no possibility of choosing health insurance coverage. By forcing consumers to satisfy a
series of period-specific budget constraints, the model can be thought of as providing an upper
bound on the effect of health insurance on employment decisions. If couples could save in
anticipation of adverse health shocks (i.e., self-insure), then health insurance would not be as
valuable and the incentive to make employment decisions based on health insurance
considerations would be weaker. Similarly, if individuals could acquire retiree health insurance
coverage by changing jobs or by purchasing private non-group insurance, then the employment
decisions of individuals with and without retiree coverage might not be very different. Thus by
limiting other mechanisms for smoothing consumption to account for health risk, the model forces
consumers who wish to avoid exposure to health risk and who lack retiree health benefits to
remain employed. If the estimates of this model imply little impact of health insurance on
employment, then we would expect that relaxing these assumptions would also yield small
impacts. On the other hand, if the estimates imply a large impact of health insurance on
employment, then it would be important to determine whether the findings are robust to allowing
5Starr-McCluer (1996) provides evidence that suggests that precautionary saving by
individuals without health insurance is rare.
6Experience is a state variable because it affects the Social Security benefit. Tenure is a
state variable because it affects the pension benefit, if any. We keep track of tenure only on the
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savings and health insurance choice.5
We specify a discrete state, discrete time model of employment and medical care choices
of married couples. At the beginning of a period, a couple learns the realizations of all stochastic
processes for the period. Given these realizations and the values of deterministic state variables
such as work experience and job tenure, the couple makes its choices for the period and these
choices remain fixed for the duration of the period. State variables are updated at the end of the
period, and the process repeats until the terminal date, T*. The length of a period is two years,
corresponding to the time between interviews in the HRS. Below we describe the states, choices,
and stochastic processes for employment, health insurance, health, medical care, income, and
divorce, followed by specification of utility and value functions, the solution method, and
estimation issues.
A. Employment
The employment status of member a = m (male),  f (female), of a couple at the end of
period t is eat, where eat=0 denotes not employed, and eat=1 denotes employed. Other employment-
related state variables include x1at, the cumulative labor market experience of spouse a at the end
of period t; x2at, the cumulative job tenure of spouse a at the end of period t; fea, the age at which
spouse a first receives Social Security benefits; rea, an indicator for whether spouse a ever re-
enters employment after beginning to collect Social Security benefits; and Lat, a binary indicator of
whether spouse a was laid off at the beginning of period t.6 With probability * an individual who
job held at the initial survey date, because pensions on jobs held after the first job are not
modeled. An individual is assumed to become entitled for Social Security benefits in the first
period in which he or she is not employed beginning at age 62. Thus, unlike Rust and Phelan
(1997), we do not model the decision to apply for benefits. See the Appendix for details on the
roles of fea and rea in the model.
7Actually, Medicare is available only after two years on SSDI. We take SSDI enrollment
as given and do not model applications to SSDI. Following SSDI policy, we assume that
individuals younger than 65 can receive Medicare through SSDI only if not employed.
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was employed in period t-1 is laid off at the beginning of period t. Individuals receive a job offer
from a new employer at the beginning of each period. Jobs are assumed to be identical except for
the earnings and health insurance they offer.
Let jat=1, 2, 3 represent the job choice of spouse a in period t. If the individual was
employed in period t-1 and not laid off at the beginning of period t, he chooses among (1) non-
employment, (2) the new job offer, and (3) the old job. If the individual was laid off at the
beginning of t or was not employed during t-1, he chooses between (1) non-employment and (2)
the new job. The employment state at the beginning of period t is determined as: eat = 1 if ja,t-1>1
and Lat=0; eat = 0 if ja,t-1=1 or Lat=1.
B. Health Insurance
Until the age of Medicare eligibility, we assume that during a given period an individual
can be covered by one and only one of the following types of health insurance: (0) none; (1) own-
employer, with retiree coverage available; (2) own-employer, no retiree coverage available; (3)
spouse-employer, with coverage available to the individual after the spouse retires; (4) spouse-
employer, with coverage not available to the individual after the spouse retires; (5) private (non-
employer); (6) Medicare. Medicare is available to individuals under the age of 65 only if they
receive Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI).7 We assume that upon reaching age 65, an
8Medigap insurance is secondary coverage that pays for expenses not covered by
Medicare. Medicare rules require that employer and private plans must be the primary payer even
after age 65 if the individual is employed. If retired, then Medicare is the primary payer.
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individual enrolls in Medicare and may have at most one additional source of coverage. Employer
and private health insurance convert to Medigap coverage at age 65, as required by Medicare
rules.8
As noted above, computational feasibility requires that we treat health insurance coverage
as given. Thus, we assign a couple their observed health insurance coverage and characteristics in
the periods for which we have data. Changes in coverage observed in the data are assumed to
have been perfectly foreseen by the couple. We assume that couples expect their health insurance
coverage to remain unchanged following the last period for which we have data. If an individual
changes jobs, he is assumed to act as if he will be covered on the new job by the same type of
health insurance he had in the last period of the data. The characteristics of health insurance on
new jobs (premium, deductible, etc.) are assumed to be those of a “generic” plan described in the
Appendix, instead of the characteristics of the plan the individual had in the data. If an individual
is covered by his employer’s health insurance plan without retiree coverage, he becomes
uninsured if he leaves employment. He remains uninsured until he becomes employed again or
reaches age 65 and receives Medicare coverage. Similarly, if an individual is covered by his
spouse’s employer’s plan without retiree coverage, he becomes uninsured when his spouse leaves
employment, and remains uninsured until she gets a new job or he turns 65. Health insurance
coverage of individuals covered by employer plans with retiree insurance or by private plans is
unaffected by employment decisions.
C. Health
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Health status of spouse a, hat, is a discrete variable that can take on values 0, 1, 2, where 0
denotes good, 1 denotes bad, and 2 denotes death. The probability of observing spouse a in health
status hN during period t+1 given that he or she was in health status h during period t is 










where A is age, and the (’s are parameters. This first-order markov model does not allow medical
care in period t to affect health in period t+1, so medical care is assumed to be desired only for
“palliative” reasons, as specified in the utility function below.
D. Medical Care
Doctor visits (vat) and hospital nights (kat) are choice variables, with each freely chosen
from a set of three alternatives. In principle, the choice sets should include all non-negative
integers but for computational reasons we limit the choices to three. The three alternatives for
doctor visits per period are 0, 3, and 10, and for hospital nights are 0, 2, and 14. These
correspond to averages observed within categories defined by 0,1-5, and 6+. The out-of-pocket
medical expenses mt of the couple depend on the number of visits and hospital nights of each
spouse, the price per visit, and the characteristics of the health insurance coverage of the spouses
at the beginning of the period:
  mt = m(vft, kft, vmt, kmt, Fm, Ff, pvt, pkt)        (2)
where the p’s are per-visit and per-night prices, and the F’s are vectors of characteristics of
insurance plans, such as deductibles, coinsurance rates, premiums, and so forth. These are
specified in more detail below. This function is deterministic, and gives out-of-pocket medical
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expenses for any feasible combination of office visits and hospital nights. Medical care is modeled
as a choice rather than as a draw from a distribution (as in Rust and Phelan, 1997) so that the
information on characteristics of insurance plans (F) can be used in the budget constraint, and to
allow for the possibility that the demand for medical care is not perfectly inelastic.
E. Income and Consumption
Earnings per period Wat are non-stochastic, and are determined by a function known to the
couple (specified in the next section). Social Security and pension benefits bt are also non-
stochastic and depend on the age, experience, tenure, and employment status of the husband and
wife according to known rules summarized in the function
bt = b(emt, x1mt, x2mt, Amt, eft, x1ft, x2ft, Aft, gt)        (3)
where gt is income from assets. This function is shorthand notation for the rules of the Social
Security system and the pension plans covering each individual in the sample. Employment status
(eat) matters because of the Social Security earnings test. Experience affects the Social Security
Average Indexed Monthly Earnings, the basis on which benefits are computed. Tenure affects
benefits in many pension plans. Age affects eligibility for Social Security and pension benefits and
the level of benefits. Specific details are described in the next section and the Appendix. Asset
accumulation is not modeled, so asset income  is treated as given. Given the absence of savings,
consumption in period t equals total family income in period t net of out-of-pocket medical
expenses, and is given by
Ct = Wmt1[jmt>1]  + Wft1[jft>1]  +  bt  -  mt  -  K(wmt1[jmt>1] + wft1[jft>1], bt, mt)        (4)
where 1[jat>1] is an indicator function that takes on the value 1 if the individual chooses to be
employed, and zero otherwise; and K( ) is the tax function, incorporating income and payroll
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taxes and accounting for the medical expense deduction.
F. Divorce and Death.
Divorce is not modeled as a choice, but rather as the result of an exogenous stochastic
process. A marriage ends in divorce or separation at the end of period t, an event denoted by
Dt=1, with probability Pr(Dt=1). In practice, we simply set Pr(Dt=1) to the sample average divorce
rate observed between 1992 and 1994. In order to avoid the complications of modeling behavior
following divorce, we assign a “terminal value” to the event of the marriage ending as a result of
divorce, and do not model behavior following divorce. The terminal value is denoted V(Dt=1),
and is normalized to -200. We follow the same approach for widowhood: a terminal value is
assigned and the behavior of the surviving spouse is not modeled. The terminal value function in
the event of the death of spouse a is given by V(hat=2) and is also normalized to -200. If both
spouses die in the same period the terminal value function is also normalized: V(hmt = hft = 2) / -
200.
G. Utility Function
Utility of the couple in period t depends on each member’s choice of employment and
medical care, and on health, consumption, exogenous characteristics, and a shock. Define an
indicator wat for whether spouse a chooses to be employed in period t, regardless of whether the
job is new or old: wat = 0 if jat = 1; wat = 1 if jat > 1. Utility in period t is (suppressing a household
subscript)






t % "2hmvmt % "3hmkmt % "4hfvft % "5hfkft
9One of the 16 intercepts is normalized to zero. The "’s are defined only for bad and good
health (h=0 or 1), not for death (h=2).
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% "6hmemt&11[jmt'2] % "7hmemt&11[jmt'1] % "8hfeft&11[jft'2] % "9hfeft&11[jft'1]
 +  ,t(jmt, jft, hmt, hft, vmt, vft, kmt, kft) if Ct>0        (5)"10hmwmAmt % "11hfwfAft
=   +   ,t(jmt, jft, hmt, hft, vmt, vft, kmt, kft) if Ct#0        (6)"12
where 1[ ] is a binary indicator that takes on the value 1 if the statement in the brackets is true,
and zero otherwise. The utility function incorporates the following features. (1) The intercept ("0)
varies freely by  employment choice and health of both spouses.9 Hence, employment preferences
are allowed to be non-separable within a period across spouses. (2) The utility of consumption is
separable from other items and takes the isoelastic form, with coefficient of relative risk aversion
"1 independent of choices and states. (3) Preferences for medical care are linear, separable, and
depend on own health. (4) Employment preferences are dynamic and depend on health. A utility
cost of changing jobs (j=2) is included ("6 and "8), and the utility of being out of the labor force
(j=1) depends on whether or not the individual was employed in the previous period ("7 and "9).
(5) Age (A) affects utility with health-and-employment-specific parameters. (6) The parameter"12
allows for aversion to negative consumption, which  was found to be important by Rust and
Phelan (1997). (7) The utility shocks (,) are assumed to be independently and identically Type I
Extreme Value distributed, within periods and over time. This rules out both serial correlation and
contemporaneous correlation in the shocks.
This function characterizes the utility of a couple in which both members are alive. Since
we do not model behavior following the end of a marriage, we do not specify a utility function for
10Blundell et al. (1998) show that a static collective model imposes different restrictions on
the data than a static unitary utility function model when there is a continuous choice variable
such as hours of work. In the absence of a continuous choice variable, the sharing rule parameters
in the collective model are not identified. As shown in Blundell et al. (p. 12), the sharing rule
parameters are identified from the labor supply function, and there is no labor supply function in a
pure discrete choice model.
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individual members of the couple. Given that the choices we model are all discrete, the
implications of the family utility function model specified here cannot be distinguished from those
of a collective model in which each spouse has his or her own utility function and the couple
reaches a Pareto-efficient bargain.10
H. Value Function
The expected present discounted value (EPDV) of a couple’s remaining lifetime utility in
period t<T* resulting from a given set of choices, conditional on the vector of state variables
other than health (st), and the vector of period t utility shocks (,t) is



































       (7)% $Pr(Dt%1'1)V(Dt%1'1)
where $ is the discount factor. The value function accounts for the divorce probability (Pr(Dt=1)),
the probability of death of one or both spouses ( ), and the probability of arriving in period t+1B
ha2
at
with the marriage intact and both spouses alive and in any combination of good and bad health.
The maximal EPDV of remaining lifetime utility from being in health states hmt+1 and hft+1
in period t+1 unconditional on period t+1 choices is
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where the expected value is taken with respect to ,t+1, and the max is taken with respect to the
choices jmt+1, jft+1, vmt+1, vft+1, kmt+1, and kft+1.
I. Solution
The model is solved numerically by backward recursion, following the standard approach
to solution of finite horizon discrete choice dynamic programing problems (e.g., Eckstein and
Wolpin, 1989). We use two approximations in the solution instead of solving the model exactly.
The recursive solution must be computed for every couple and every trial value of all parameters.
The state space in our model is very large, and the exact solution takes too long to compute for
this to be feasible. For computational feasibility, we truncate the decision period at T < T*.
Following Mroz and Weir (1993) we specify an approximation to the value function at T+1, given
by 
 f(sT+1, hmT+1, hfT+1 | H),       (9)V
hmT%1hfT%1(sT%1) .
where f( ) is a function of the state space at T, and H is a vector of parameters estimated jointly
with other parameters of the model. In addition to reducing the computational burden, by setting
T so that the oldest age to which we model behavior is relatively young (67 in what follows
below), we avoid solving the model for ages far beyond those observed in the data. The second
approximation is to compute the value function for a randomly selected subset of points in the
state space at each period instead of for all points in the state space. Following Keane and Wolpin
(1994) the value function is regressed on the state variables using the sample of randomly selected
points in the state space for which the value function was computed exactly. The estimated
regression parameters are used to approximate the value function for the points in the state space
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for which the value function was not computed exactly. See Keane and Wolpin (1994) for details
and for a monte carlo analysis of the method.
As part of the recursive solution, we compute choice probabilities for the observed
choices for each couple. As a consequence of the assumptions about the ,’s, the choice
probabilities have the multinomial logit form:































zero otherwise, J( ) is the number of employment alternatives available (J=3 if the individual was
employed in the previous period and not laid off at the beginning of the period ; otherwise J=2), K







,t(jmt, jft, hmt, hft, vmt, vft, kmt, kft). 
J. Estimation
Let t=1 denote the period in which we first observe a couple (the 1992 survey), and let
t=0 denote the period prior to the first observation. We observe employment and medical care
choices as well as health for t=1, 2, and employment-related state variables for periods t=0 and
t=1. We treat employment in t=0 and health in t=1 as initial conditions that are not to be explained
by the model. We take employment and medical care choices for t=1,2 and the health transition
from t=1 to t=2 as quantities to be explained by the model. The likelihood contribution for a
couple who does not divorce or attrit from the sample and in which neither spouse dies by period
2, is
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The likelihood contribution for a couple that divorces before the beginning of period 2 omits the
period 2 choice and layoff probabilities and replaces  with   The(1&Pr(D2'1))
1&D2 Pr(D2'1)
D2
likelihood contribution for a couple that experiences a death before period 2 omits the period 2
choice and layoff probabilities, and the divorce probability. The likelihood contribution for a
couple that attrits before period 2 includes only the period 1 choice probability.
K. Identification
The key identifying assumptions are no saving, no income shocks, and no health insurance
shocks. With these assumptions, consumption equals current income net of medical expenses,
which can be computed for alternative employment and medical care choices both in the current
period and in future periods. Given the normalization of terminal value functions in the event of
divorce or death as described above, and given a normalization of one of the utility function
parameters, the remaining parameters are identified. Details are given in the Appendix. Briefly, the
observed employment and medical care choices directly identify all of the utility function
parameters except "1, the risk-aversion coefficient. The latter is identified by the employment
choices of couples whose health insurance depends on employment. Given the health risk they
face (and given the utility of medical care), their employment choices reveal how willing they are
to bear risk. The health transition parameters are identified by the observed health transitions.
Finally, the terminal value function parameters (H, defined in equation 9) are identified by the




We use data from the first two waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), fielded
in 1992 and 1994. The survey includes an employment history, and extensive sections on
pensions, health insurance, Social Security, earnings, assets, income, and health. Two additional
sources of information have been matched to the survey responses. The Social Security earnings
records of individuals who agreed to sign release forms were made available by the Social
Security Administration. And individuals who reported being covered by a pension or by
employer-provided health insurance were asked to provide the names and addresses of the firms
that provide the coverage. These firms were surveyed by telephone as part of the Health
Insurance and Pension Provider Survey (HIPPS) and asked to provide details of health insurance
plans over the telephone and to provide written descriptions of their pension plans.  These
supplementary sources of data provide crucial pieces of information that allow us to accurately
measure the budget constraint facing each couple. However, they also limit the sample that we
can use because there are many cases in which the supplementary information is unavailable.
Of the 4,704 married couples who were surveyed in 1992, 3,027 meet our age criteria.
The age criteria are that the husband is 51-63 at the 1992 survey, his wife is not older than him,
and his wife is at most ten years younger than him. We restrict the sample to couples in which the
wife is not older than the husband because the age of the husband is (arbitrarily) used to specify
the terminal period (his age = 67).  We lose many observations as a result of missing data on
employer health insurance in the HIPPS file and missing information on Social Security. The
estimation sample is 675 couples. The estimation sample is similar to the full sample in most
respects (see Tables A-1 and A-2 in the Appendix). The only major difference is in health
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insurance coverage, with only half the couples in the estimation sample covered by employer
health insurance compared to about three fourths in the full sample. This is a result of eliminating
many couples with employer health insurance who did not have a HIPPS record or who were
missing data on the HIPPS file. If the structural parameters are invariant across observations, then
this sample can be used to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters despite its
nonrepresentative nature with respect to health insurance.
B. Employment Status
Employment status is recorded at the wave 1 and wave 2 survey dates. The wave 2 survey
is on average two years after the wave 1 survey. A job history collected at wave 1 allows us to
determine employment status two years prior to the date of the wave 1 interview. This gives us a
measure of employment status at t=0. Table 3 displays the employment distributions at the wave 1
and 2 survey dates for the estimation sample. The rate of non-employment increases by 2.9
percentage points between surveys for men and 2.1 points for women, and the rate of joint non-
employment increases by 1.7 points between surveys. 
C. Medical Care
     The HRS asks respondents to report the number of nights spent in the hospital and the number
of times they have seen or talked to a medical doctor about their health, including emergency
room or clinic visits, during the 12 months preceding the wave 1 interview and during the interval
between the wave 1 and wave 2 interviews. We collapse the distributions into the three categories
shown in Table 4. Wives visit the doctor more often than husbands, but husbands are more likely
11The length of a period in our model is two years, but dollar magnitudes such as earnings
and pension benefits are measured on an annual basis in the HRS. In solution of the model we
divide the number of visits and hospital nights reported at wave 2 by two before assigning the
individual to the appropriate category. This puts the wave 2 medical care variables on an annual
basis. After computing annual consumption, we multiply it by two in solving the model.
12 See Blau and Gilleskie (in press), Bound et al. (1999), and Dwyer and Mitchell (1999)
for detailed analyses of the effect of health on employment in the HRS.
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to have a hospital stay.11
D. Health
     The HRS has a rich set of health measures, including self-assessed general health and
disability, functional limitations, chronic diseases, and many others.  Despite this abundance of
measures, we take a very simple approach to measuring health in order to focus on the economic
aspects of the analysis and avoid the proliferation of parameters that would result from exploiting
the richness of the health data.12 We create a dichotomous measure of health at waves 1 and 2
from responses to the question “Would you say your health is excellent, very good, good, fair, or
poor?” by combining excellent, very good, and good (good), and poor and fair (bad). The
distribution of health and health changes is shown in Table 5. Of the men who report good health
at wave 1, 7.3 percent are in bad health by wave 2 and 1.4 percent have died. The corresponding
figures for women are 10.2 and 0.6 percent. Of those who report bad health at wave 1, 21.2
percent of men and 27.8 percent of women are in good health at wave 2, and 9.7 percent of men
and 3.5 percent of women have died. The very large differential in death rates by self-assessed
health status illustrates the fact that self-reported health contains useful information. There is a
strong positive association between health of husbands and wives: of men in good health, 85
percent have wives who are also in good health, while for men in bad health only 65-67 percent
13Health insurance is a family affair. For example, of men with no health insurance, two-
thirds or more of their wives are also uninsured. Of men with own-employer insurance with RHI,
two thirds of their wives are covered by their husband’s insurance. Of husbands with private
insurance, two-thirds or more of their wives also have private insurance. These figures are not
shown in the table.
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have wives in good health (not shown in the table).
E. Health Insurance
The HRS provides data on the source of the respondent's health insurance, but it does not
provide information on the premium, deductible, coinsurance rate, etc. We use the HRS data to
classify each individual into one of the 7 mutually exclusive and exhaustive health insurance
categories shown in Table 6. Individuals with multiple sources of insurance were assigned to
categories in the following order: own-employer with retiree health insurance (RHI); spouse
employer with RHI; own-employer without RHI; spouse employer without RHI; Medicare;
private. For example, a man with both employer-provided coverage and privately purchased
coverage is assigned to employer coverage.13 The characteristics of health insurance plans that we
use in constructing the budget constraint are shown in Appendix Table A-3. They include the
premium, deductible, coinsurance rate, maximum out-of-pocket costs, and maximum coverage.
There is substantial variation across plans both in whether a given feature is present and the
magnitude.
Private insurance plans were not included in the HIPPS survey and the characteristics of
such plans (except for the premium) were not recorded in the HRS, so we use data from the 1987
National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES) to construct a set of characteristics of a “generic”
private plan, and assign these to all private plans. Finally, Medicare characteristics and rules
governing the interaction between Medicare and other insurance beginning at age 65 are used.
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See the Appendix for details.  The HRS also lacks information on the price per doctor visit and
hospital night, so we derive these measures from the NMES as described in the Appendix.
F. Pensions
The HRS collects detailed data from respondents on pensions for all current and former
jobs that provide pension coverage. This includes information on the type of plan (defined benefit
or defined contribution), years included in the plan, the respondent's current contribution rate, the
age at which the respondent expects to receive benefits, the expected benefit amount, and various
other features.  These data provide a rich source of descriptive information, but do not include the
actual formula used to determine the benefit as a function of age of exit from the firm, tenure,
earnings, and so forth. The formula is needed in order to compute the benefit to which the
respondent would be entitled at different ages of exit from the firm. The written plan descriptions
provided as part of the HIPPS interview provide the information needed to construct the formula.
We used these data together with the HRS survey responses to compute the benefit from the
pension on the job held at period t=1 (if any) for every possible quit date from 1992 until the
respondent reaches the terminal age. For pensions provided by previous employers we compute
the benefit to which the individual would be entitled at the earliest age at which he is eligible for a
benefit under the plan. Appendix Table A-4 summarizes characteristics of pensions.
G. Earnings
We treat earnings as deterministic because of the computational complexity of modeling
earnings uncertainty and the drastic increase in the size of the state space that would be caused by
allowing the distribution of earnings to depend on earnings in the previous period. Aside from the
risk of layoff, which we do model, we view earnings fluctuations as a relatively minor source of
14Earnings records in the SSER file are truncated at the maximum taxable annual earnings.
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risk at older ages compared to health risk. Consequently, the main issue for modeling earnings is
how to obtain good forecasts to include in the model as a measure of expectations about future
earnings. After considerable experimentation, we decided to use the most recent measure of
earnings from the Social Security Earnings Record (SSER) file, denoted “lastearn,” as an estimate
of an individual's earnings in any period in which he chooses to be employed on the job (if any)
held at the survey date in 1992. The mean in the estimation sample is $23,481 (sd $17,863) for
men, and $11,240 ($11,465) for women in the full sample.14 For earnings on new jobs, we
estimated a regression explaining log annual earnings from the 1992 and 1994 HRS interviews as
a function of lastearn, health, and whether the job was different from the job held two years
earlier. The parameters from these regressions are used to assign earnings expectations for new
jobs in solution of the model. See the Appendix for the estimates.
H. Social Security Benefits
     We use the SSER earnings history from 1951 through 1991 to construct each individual's
Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) and Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) as of 1991,
using the formula in effect for 1991. The AIME is a deflated average of earnings from age 21 to
the current age, minus the lowest five years of earnings. The PIA is a progressive function of the
AIME, and is the basis for computing the Social Security Benefit (SSB). We then use the earnings
measures described above to update the AIME and PIA for each of the possible total number of
years of experience the individual could accumulate from 1992 through the terminal age. We use
these to compute the SSB for which an individual would be eligible upon exiting the labor force
for each possible number of years of experience from 1992 through age 67. These benefit
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measures are based on the exact formulas used by the Social Security Administration (which differ
by cohort as the 1983 Social Security reforms are phased in), accounting for reduced benefits for
early retirement and increased benefits for delayed retirement.  We do not model the decision to
apply for Social Security benefits.  Instead, we assume that an individual begins to receive Social
Security benefits in the first period in which he or she is not employed from age 62 on. Further
details and summary statistics are provided in the Appendix.
I. Other Income and Taxes
Other sources of nonwage income include income from assets, rent, alimony, veteran’s
benefits, and earnings of family members other than the husband and wife.  We treat these sources
of income as exogenous and certain. Benefits from SSDI are included if an individual is covered
by Medicare while under 65 and chooses non-employment. These are computed using the SSDI
rules. Income from means-tested government programs such as Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) is excluded. We summed these sources to create a measure of nonwage income for the
calendar years prior to the wave 1 and wave 2 interviews. The average of these two measures is
assigned as the value of nonwage income for all periods.
We use the 1992 Federal income tax and payroll tax schedules to compute measures of
after-tax income.  The computations account for taxation of Social Security benefits and the 
medical expense deduction. Because income is measured on an annual basis and the length of a
period is two years in our model, we set consumption equal to twice the value of after-tax income
net of out-of-pocket medical expenses.
5. Results
15Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) and Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999) calibrate the
coefficient of relative risk aversion to 3; Deaton (1991) uses values of 2 and 3; Carroll (1997)
uses 2; and Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (1998) use values of 1 and 3.
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A. Estimates
Table 7 shows estimates of the utility function parameters. The coefficient of relative risk
aversion ("1) is estimated to be 1.116. This is fairly close to Hurd’s (1989) estimates using micro
data of 0.73 and 1.12, but substantially lower than the values often assumed in simulation studies
of savings behavior.15 A CRRA of 1.116 implies that the certainty-equivalent value of a gamble
that pays $20,000 and $40,000 with equal probability is $28,100, compared to $30,000 under risk
neutrality (CRRA=0). This is a moderate degree of risk aversion. The utility function intercept
("0) was normalized to zero for the case in which both spouses are in good health and not
employed. The utility intercepts are lower when the wife is in bad health compared to good
health, other things equal, but the pattern for husbands is mixed. Similarly, the utility intercepts
are always lower when the wife is not employed than when she is employed, other things equal, as
would be expected if leisure is a normal good. But this pattern appears for husbands only when he
is in bad health, not when he is in good health. 
Preliminary estimates indicated that the parameters on medical care and employment
transition indicators were very similar across spouses, so the specification presented here
constrains them to be equal for husbands and wives. These restrictions were not rejected by a
likelihood ratio test. Medical care provides greater utility (or less disutility) when in bad health
than in good health ("i0 > "i1, i=2-5). Changing jobs and exiting employment are estimated to have
utility costs ("6, "7, "8, "9 < 0) in the period in which these events occur. The utility of being not
employed while in good health rises with age for both spouses ("10,00, "11,00 > 0), but the utility of
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non-employment while in bad health declines with age ("10,10, "11,10 < 0). The utility of being
employed declines with age much faster if in bad health than in good health ("10,01 > "10,11; "11,01 >
"11,11). The utility associated with negative consumption is negative and large ("12< 0).
Other parameter estimates are shown in the Appendix. The health transition parameters
were estimated outside the model (by multinomial logit) as in Rust and Phelan (1997). Given the
assumed absence of unobserved heterogeneity, this provides consistent estimates, although the
standard errors of the utility function parameters have not been adjusted to reflect the separate
estimation of the health transition parameters. The parameters for the probability of divorce and
layoff were estimated outside the model and fixed. The discount factor was fixed at .925 for two
year periods, implying a biannual rate of time preference of 8.1 percent. After considerable
experimentation with alternative forms for the terminal value function, we found that the other
parameters of the model were insensitive to the form of the latter. Hence, we specified the
terminal value function as -eH, where H is a constant. The estimated value of H is 4.536, which
implies a terminal value at age 67 of the husband of -93.3 in the event that both spouses are alive
at that date. This is higher than the terminal values for death and divorce, which were normalized
to -200.
B. Model Fit
Table 8 illustrates some aspects of the fit of the model to the data. The overall fit of the
model to the employment data shown in panel A is good: the predicted non-employment and job
changing probabilities are only 1.8-1.9 points too high for husbands, and 2.8 points too high for
wives. The model also fits reasonably well in most cases when choices are classified by
employment status in the previous period. An exception is that the model predicts an exit rate
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from employment for wives of .228, much higher than the observed exit rate of .145. The
predicted distribution of joint husband-wife employment choices shown in panel D fits the actual
distribution very well unconditional on employment status in the previous period. However, the
model substantially under-predicts the probability that both spouses remain not employed when
both were not employed in the previous period (.646 predicted versus .730 actual) and the
probability that both spouses remain employed when both were employed previously (.558
predicted versus .717 actual).
The model places too much weight on the tails of the doctor visit distribution (panel B),
over-predicting the probability of no visits and of 6+ visits, and substantially under-predicting the
probability of 1-5 visits. For hospital nights, the model under-predicts the probability of no
hospital nights, over-predicts the probability of 1-3 nights, and gets the probability of 4+ nights
about right. Both patterns also appear when medical care choices are disaggregated by health
status.
Table 9 illustrates the fit of the model to employment choices by health insurance
category. Recall that health insurance enters the model only through the budget constraint - there
are no utility function or other parameters on health insurance. In view of this, the model does a
surprisingly good job of fitting employment choices by health insurance category, at least
qualitatively, if not quantitatively. The model captures the higher rate of non-employment of
individuals with own-employer insurance with retiree benefits compared to individuals without
retiree benefits (men: actual .241 vs. .031; predicted .269 vs. .160; women: actual .138 vs. .048;
predicted, .279 vs. .217). The model also captures the higher non-employment rate of the spouse
when an individual’s insurance coverage is from the spouse’s employer with versus without
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retiree benefits (men: actual .280 vs. .013; predicted .288 vs. .145; women: actual .152 vs. .048;
predicted .275 vs. .210).
Table 10 compares predicted to actual employment choices by health insurance category
conditional on employment status in the previous period. The model fits the qualitative features of
the data in most cases, but is often far off quantitatively. The model predicts that non-employed
men with retiree benefits are more likely to remain non-employed than are non-employed men
without retiree benefits (.786 versus .679) but the actual difference (.789 versus .200) is much
larger than the predicted difference. The same is true conditional on having been employed the
previous period (.111 vs. .022 actual, and .147 vs. .132 predicted). The model captures the fact
that wives of husbands whose insurance is from the wife’s employer are more likely to exit
employment if they have retiree insurance than if they don’t (.083 vs. .000 actual; .221 vs. .189
predicted), but again the magnitude of the effect is under-predicted. The patterns are similar when
employment choices are classified by the wife’s health insurance.
C. Policy Simulations
In order to assess the implications of the estimates, we used them to simulate employment
behavior under alternative scenarios. The simulations were computed for each couple in the
sample conditional on the couple’s initial state observed at the beginning of period t=1. Couples
were randomly assigned an alternative from their choice set in period 1, with the probability of a
particular alternative equal to the choice probability for that alternative computed from the model.
The estimated health transition and layoff probabilities were used to randomly assign health and
layoffs in period 2. The assigned choice along with health and layoff status were then used to
16In principle, this could be done for up to nine periods, the maximum number of periods
for which the model is solved for the youngest cohort (a man who is 51 in t=1 is 67 in t=9).
However, in simulation, unlike in estimation, choice probabilities must be stored for each possible
alternative at every point in the state space, and for periods 7-9 the state space is too large to
make this feasible. In the simulations we assume that there are no divorces or deaths, so the
sample composition does not change over time.
17Health insurance is universal in the column three simulation in the sense that everyone
has it regardless of employment status, but not in the sense that everyone has the same plan.
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update the state for the next period. This was repeated through t=6 or T, whichever came first.16
The results were then averaged over the sample and, for the results shown in Table 11, over age. 
Column one of Table 11 shows results from a baseline simulation of employment choices
and transitions using the observed values of all variables and policies. Columns two and three
show results from simulations in which all individuals are assigned no health insurance (column
two) and universal health insurance independent of employment status (column three). Universal
health insurance was implemented by re-assigning all cases with no health insurance and with
Medicare under 65 to the generic private plan, and by re-assigning all cases with own or spouse
employer insurance without retiree benefits to own or spouse employer insurance with retiree
benefits, assuming the plan provisions are the same for retirees and active workers. This ensures
that everyone has health insurance and no one loses insurance by leaving employment. These are 
extreme policy changes, but they are useful for bracketing the magnitudes of the employment
responses implied by the model.17 If health risk causes couples to remain employed longer than
they might otherwise prefer in order avoid being uninsured, then universal health insurance should
increase the rate of non-employment compared to the baseline and to the no-health-insurance
scenario. In fact, the results in Table 11 shows the opposite: universal health insurance causes
small decreases in non-employment for husbands and, compared to the no-health-insurance
18The price elasticity of demand for medical visits was computed by repeating the
simulation shown in column two of Table 11 for the no-health-insurance case, with the price of
medical visits set to zero. The arc elasticity was computed for the change in simulated medical
visits between this simulation and the column-two simulation. The no-health-insurance scenario
was used as the baseline in order to avoid the complications of computing an “effective” price for
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scenario, for wives. This results mainly from a higher rate of entry to employment from non-
employment, since the exit rate from employment changes very little for husbands and increases
for wives. Simulations by age (not shown) do not reveal any patterns.
Columns 4 and 5 show the simulated employment response to policies that add retiree
health insurance (RHI) to all employer plans that lack it (column 4) and that remove RHI from all
employer plans that have it (column 5). These responses are negligible. The largest impact of
eliminating RHI is a one point decrease in the probability that both spouses remain non employed
conditional on non-employment in the previous period (.768 versus .779). This effect is in the
right direction if aversion to health risk matters, but is very small in magnitude. The employment
responses to simulations that change all spouse coverage to own-employer coverage (column 6)
and shift the age of eligibility for Medicare from 65 to 67 (column 7) are also quite small. Both
policy changes increase non-employment, as expected, but by no more than 1.5 points. Even at
older ages there was no evidence of a strong impact of shifting the Medicare eligibility age to 67.
We examined several possible explanations for the small impact of health insurance on
employment. First, the model allows the demand for medical care to be downward-sloping. Going
uninsured would not reduce expected lifetime utility much if the demand for medical care is price-
elastic. To examine this issue, we computed the price elasticities of demand for office visits and
hospital nights implied by the model. These were close to zero, so this cannot explain the small
impact of health insurance on employment.18
each individual given the individual’s health insurance characteristics. This was repeated setting
the price of hospital nights to zero.
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Second, the estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion of 1.116 indicates that couples
are not very averse to the income fluctuations associated with health shocks. If couples are not
very risk averse, then insurance will not be very important. In order to determine whether absence
of substantial risk-aversion is responsible for the weak impact of health insurance we computed
simulations in which the risk aversion coefficient was set to a value of 3.0, while all other
parameters and variables remained unchanged. A CRRA of 3 implies a certainty-equivalent value
of $25,300 for a gamble that pays $20,000 and $40,000 with equal probability, compared to
$28,100 with the estimated value of the CRRA of 1.116. We re-computed the baseline simulation
in column one of Table 11 and the column-five simulation that eliminates all retiree health
insurance. The results are very similar to those in Table 11, showing very little sensitivity of
employment choices to health insurance. Hence, the relatively low degree of risk aversion in our
estimates is not the explanation for the lack of employment response to health insurance.
Third, in an effort to reconcile our findings with previous non-structural estimates that
show a substantial impact of health insurance on retirement, we respecified our model to include
health insurance indicators in the utility function. Previous estimates show that health insurance
affects employment behavior, while our estimates that force health insurance to operate solely
through the budget constraint show negligible effects on employment. By adding health insurance
directly to the utility function, we can determine whether health insurance affects employment
behavior through some mechanism other than the budget constraint. The only other mechanism in
our model is the utility function. We refrain from giving an economic interpretation of this
34
specification, and simply treat it as a test of our original specification. We include binary
indicators of whether the individual has own employer health insurance without RHI and whether
the individual’s spouse has insurance that covers the individual but lacks RHI. These are the two
cases in which employment decisions affect health insurance coverage. Allowing the parameters
on these variables to vary by employment choice, this adds eight new parameters to the model
(two new variables for each spouse with coefficients that vary by employment choice). A
likelihood ratio test strongly rejects the hypothesis that these parameters are jointly equal to zero.
This indicates that health insurance affects behavior through some channel other than the budget
constraint and risk aversion. The precise nature of that channel cannot be determined from these
estimates. The estimates from this specification imply behavior similar to that shown in Table 2: a
greater likelihood of exit from employment with RHI than without RHI.
Another possible explanation for the absence of health insurance effects on employment is
that health insurance is endogenous to employment behavior. We found evidence that this is the
case in our earlier non-structural work (Blau and Gilleskie, 2001b). Allowing health insurance to
be a choice (as well as accounting for the possibility that the health insurance coverage observed
at the beginning of the first period) proved to be beyond the limit of computational feasibility.
However, as we argued above, intuition suggests that allowing for choice of health insurance
would if anything weaken the impact of health insurance on employment decisions.
Our approach to modeling retiree health insurance and employment is most similar to that
of Rust and Phelan (1997), whose results imply a much larger impact of RHI on labor force exit
than do our results. We use more recent data (the HRS from the 1990s versus the RHS from the
1970s) and have access to more accurate measures of health insurance coverage than Rust and
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Phelan. Their results show a very similar degree of risk aversion to ours, 1.072 versus 1.116.
Their specification allows health to affect the marginal utility of consumption, and they find that
poor health increases the marginal utility of consumption by 26 percent, other things equal. In
other respects, our specification is fairly similar to theirs. Consumption (net of medical expenses)
is more likely to be low when in poor health than in good health. Thus if the marginal utility of
consumption is higher when health is poor, then health insurance would be relatively valuable and
individuals will be more likely to remain employed in order to stay insured. In on-going work we
are estimating a specification that allows health to affect the marginal utility of consumption .
6. Conclusions
Our findings here indicate that health insurance has little impact on the labor force
behavior of older married couples. The findings contrast sharply with estimates from reduced
form and approximation models, which suggest that retiree health insurance has a strong effect on
employment behavior at older ages. Studies using those approaches cannot determine whether
health insurance affects employment behavior through aversion to the consequences of health risk
or through some other mechanism. In the model analyzed here, aversion to the consequences of
health risk is the only channel through which health insurance is allowed to affect behavior, and
the effects we estimate are small. If these results are correct, then policy changes that alter the
connection between health insurance and employment will have little impact on retirement
decisions in the U.S. It is important to do more research before accepting this conclusion,
however. As computing cost falls, models that allow for saving and choice of health insurance
should be explored. Our intuition is that allowing saving and choice of health insurance would
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reinforce the conclusion that health insurance is not an important determinant of retirement
decisions of older married couples, but empirical analysis is required to determine if this is correct. 
19In order to make the programming easier, we also eliminated a few cases in which the
wife was substantially younger than the husband and there were no other wives of similar age of
husbands of a given age. These cases are: husband 53, wife less than 47; husband 56, wife less




A. Sample Selection and Characteristics
Table A-1 describes how we obtain the estimation sample of 675 couples. We lose 278 of
the age-eligible couples as a result of missing information on employment, demographic variables,
health insurance, and health, leaving 2,749 cases.19  Social Security records are missing for either
the husband or the wife (or both) in 992 of these cases, leaving 1,757 cases. Most of the cases
without Social Security records are the result of the absence of a signed release, but some cases
may be due to the fact that an individual was never employed in a job covered by Social Security.
This is difficult to determine from the HRS so we drop all cases without a Social  Security record.
Of the remaining couples, 408 include at least one member who reports being covered by
employer-provided health insurance but for whom there is no record on the Health Insurance and
Pension Provider Survey (HIPPS). Records are missing if the respondent did not provide a name
and address for the relevant employer or if the employer did not respond to the request for an
interview. There is also a substantial amount of missing health insurance information in the HIPPS
records: of the 1,349 couples remaining after dropping cases with missing HIPPS data, we lose
half as a result of item non-response on the HIPPS survey. The HRS interview asked respondents
to provide some information about their health insurance, but did not include questions on the key
variables we need, so we are forced to drop all cases with missing health insurance data. After
dropping these cases, there are no further cases with missing pension data from the HIPPS
20Of the individuals who report being covered by a pension from a current or former
employer, about 60 percent can be matched to a written plan description provided by the
employer.  Over half of these descriptions are missing information that we need. However, the
HRS asked respondents to provide a large amount of information about their pensions, and this
allowed us to fill in missing data on pensions from former employers.  We were also able to fill in




Names and addresses of 4,487 establishments with health insurance plans covering an
HRS respondent were obtained from the respondents in the wave 1 survey.  Of these, 3,350
responded to the HIPPS telephone survey, yielding a file with observations on 6,505 plans
(spouses covered by the same plan each have their own record with identical data). Some 430
individuals are covered by more than one plan from a given employer.  However, the survey does
not provide any information on interactions between the plans.  We ignore multiple plans and use
the “best” plan available for a given individual, where best is defined by the most generous
coverage. If an employer had multiple health insurance plans and the HRS respondent did not
provide enough information to identify which of the plans provided coverage, interviewers
requested information on the plan used by most employees at the firm.  The HIPPS file includes
data only on those plans that appear to match a plan reported by an HRS respondent. Information
about “cafeteria” plans was not elicited.  Information was collected on age and tenure
requirements that an employee must satisfy in order to be eligible for retiree coverage, but these
data were not coded.  
If an individual ever chooses employer health insurance from a source other than the
HIPPS job then we assign the individual the characteristics of a “generic” employer-provided plan
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of the type chosen. The generic employer plan characteristics were chosen as follows. Most
individuals in our sample who have a complete HIPPS record have a deductible that applies to all
services, so we specify a deductible of this type for the generic plan and set it equal to the median
deductible observed in the HIPPS data ($200).  The generic coinsurance rate is set to 20 percent,
the maximum deductible amount for office visits is $1000, the maximum deductible amount (per
year) for hospital stays is $1200, and the maximum annual coverage is $50000.  The  premium for
plans without retiree insurance is $500 and for plans with retiree coverage is $2000.
We use characteristics of Medicare that were in place as of 1994. There is no premium for
Part A, which provides coverage for hospitalization.  Coverage is provided for up to 90 days of
inpatient care during each benefit period, where a benefit period begins on entry to a hospital and
ends 60 days after the individual was last in a hospital or skilled nursing facility.  The deductible
for inpatient hospital care is $696. Days 1-60 in a hospital are fully covered once the deductible is
met. Days 61-90 require a copayment of $174 per day.  There is a lifetime reserve of 60 days of
inpatient coverage that can be applied to hospital stays that exceed 90 days during a benefit
period.  For simplicity, we assume that the lifetime reserve is available every year.  Part B
provides supplementary insurance for physician care, and has a monthly premium of $41.10, an
annual deductible of $100, and a coinsurance rate of 20 percent.  Part B coverage is optional but
we assume that everyone takes it up. Medicare is the primary payer for retirees, and is the
secondary payer for workers and their spouses aged 65 and over who elect to be covered by
employer-provided health insurance by a firm with at least 20 employees.  Employer-provided
retiree coverage converts to “Medigap” coverage at age 65 and becomes the secondary payer. 
VA/CHAMPUS  helps veterans pay for civilian medical care when military care is not
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available. There is no premium, an annual deductible of $150, a copayment of 25 percent for
outpatient care, and a copayment of min($360/day, 25 percent) for inpatient care.  Coverage is
available regardless of employment status, and the coverage integrates with Medicare at age 65 in
the same way as any other health insurance plan.
The characteristics of the private health insurance plan (except for the premium) are
obtained from private plans held by individuals in the National Medical Expenditure Survey
(NMES) data.  The deductible is $100, the coinsurance rate is 20 percent, the maximum
deductible amount is $1000, and the maximum amount covered is $100,000.  The premium is
obtained from the responses to the wave 1 HRS survey from those respondents who had private
coverage, and is set to $2221.88,  the median premium reported.
Prices for medical care services are calculated from charges for every medical care service
received by NMES respondents in 1987.  The per visit price of $65.00 reflects the 1987 average
price for a physician office visit among males 50 years old and older, updated to 1992 dollars
using the Consumer Price Index.  The price per hospital night, $1210.00, is obtained similarly.
The per night figure is the total cost of the hospital stay divided by the length of the hospital stay. 
C. Pensions
The HIPPS Survey obtained written plan descriptions for 6,381 pension plans.  The plan
characteristics were coded by the Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the University of
Michigan into a computer program that calculates benefits under alternative scenarios.  For jobs
held at the wave 1 survey, we used the program to compute the benefit to which an individual
would be entitled for every possible year in which he or she could quit the firm through age 67. 
The program takes as input the individual’s age and tenure with the firm as of wave 1, and annual
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earnings for 1991 as reported by the respondent in the wave 1 survey.   For jobs held prior to
wave 1, we used the program to compute the benefit available at the earliest age of benefit
availability, taking as input the respondent’s tenure and annual earnings at the time of exit from
the firm. Benefits are computed for both defined benefit and defined contribution plans, with
benefits for the latter expressed in the form of an annuity.  Benefits are computed for up to three
different plans from a wave 1 job and three different plans from previous jobs.
There was a substantial amount of missing data on pension benefits due to absence of
written descriptions, and written descriptions that lacked some of the information needed to
compute benefits.  The HRS asked respondents to report the age at which they expect to start
receiving benefits and the benefit amount for every pension plan for which they are or will be
eligible for a benefit.  We used these data to fill in missing values for pension benefits and age of
eligibility for jobs held prior to wave 1, since the respondent's employment decisions from wave 1
on do not affect the benefit amount from jobs held prior to wave 1. These data are not sufficient
to fill in missing information for pensions on jobs held at wave 1, since benefits from such jobs
depend on the man's employment decisions via the benefit formula, which we do not have in such
cases.
The HIPPS survey covers wave 1 employers and previous employers but does not include
any new employers after wave 1. If an individual took a job that provides pension coverage after
wave 1 we have information from the wave 2 survey about characteristics of the pension but no
information on the benefit formula, since the new employer was not included in the HIPPS survey. 
Thus we ignore pensions on jobs that begin after period t=1. Most individuals in our sample are
too old to qualify for substantial pension benefits on new jobs.
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D. Nonwage Income
Nonwage income (other than pension and Social Security benefits) consists of income
from interest, dividends, rent (net of expenses), alimony, private disability insurance, trust funds,
royalties, veterans benefits, and the earnings of household members other than the husband and
wife. Employment-conditioned sources of income such as welfare, unemployment compensation,
and workmen’s compensation are excluded. The mean of a couple’s wave 1 and wave 2 nonwage
income is assigned to the couple for all periods. The sample mean is $9,836. 
E. Social Security Benefits
The first time an individual is not employed and is at least 62 years old his or her Social
Security Benefit (SSB) is computed using the exact formula for an individual of his cohort. The
formula is cohort-specific as a result of the 1983 reforms that gradually increase the normal age of
retirement to 67 and phase in other changes as well. We use the 1992 formula for each cohort. If
an individual experiences a non-employment spell at age 62 or above and then reenters the labor
force, the SSB for which he or she is eligible upon exiting employment again can be computed
using the exact formula only by making the exact sequence of employment choices from age 62
onward a state variable. This makes the state space too large for solution of the dynamic
programming problem.  Instead we proceed as follows. First we used the exact formula to
calculate the benefit for which an individual would be eligible for every possible employment
sequence involving reentry after age 62.  We then regressed the benefit on the PIA corresponding
to the cumulative years of experience associated with the sequence at the time of re-exit, with
separate regressions for each age of re-exit and for men and women. Recall that cumulative
experience is a state variable, and the PIA associated with each possible level of cumulative
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experience is part of the data set. We use the fitted values from these regressions to assign the
SSB for non-employment spells that follow a spell of employment which itself followed a spell of
nonemployment from age 62 on (i.e., individuals in their second nonemployment spell after age
61).  The regression is of the form SSB = a + b*PIA, and the results are
        Men     Women
Age      a         b            a b
63    12.481          0.779       .709 .798
64    13.171          0.811       .175 .833
65    12.876          0.844       -.861 .870
66    14.465          0.884       -1.878 .916
67    14.909          0.915      -3.013 .951
68    15.528          0.944 -4.491 .987
69    14.805          0.974 -6.428 1.023
70    13.294          1.005      -8.791 1.058
In order to follow this approach we have to keep track of whether a given sequence of states
involves a man reentering employment following a nonemployment spell after age 61. This
increases the size of the state space but not by as much as keeping track of the exact employment
sequence. Therefore the state vector includes a binary indicator of whether a man ever reenters
employment following a nonemployment spell after age 61 ( defined as re in section 3A).
We compute benefits conditional on employment as well as non-employment, applying the
Social Security earnings test to determine the benefit entitlement conditional on being employed.
This test, which is also cohort-specific, results in zero benefits for most individuals, but some
low-earnings individuals have a positive benefit while employed. The Appendix provides summary
data on the average PIA, and further details on the computations. Finally, we compute the spouse
benefit for each individual and compare it to the individual’s own retired-worker benefit. The
individual receives the larger of the two.
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F. Earnings
Individuals who remain on the same job observed in the first period of the data are
assumed to expect their earnings to remain unchanged in real terms and to be equal to the most 
recent value of annual earnings from the SSER. Expectations of earnings on subsequent jobs are 
assumed to be determined by the following equations, which were estimated by Heckit using HRS
annual earnings data pooled across waves 1 and 2:
Men: ln(earnings) = 9.451 + .26*goodhealth -.12*newjob + .026*lastearn/1000. 
        (.074)    (.08)  (.07) (.002)
Women: ln(earnings) = 9.438 + .19*goodhealth + .28*newjob + .009*lastearn/1000.
  (.072)    (.07)        (.06)       (.003)
G. Identification
We model decisions through the terminal period T, which is the period in which the
husband reaches age 67. We observe choices of couples in which the husband’s age is between 51
and 65. Hence the last period for which we have data is T-1, and we observe the employment and
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The B’s are identified by the observed health transitions, and the V terms in the last two lines of
the expression are all normalized to -200. Thus everything in the last three lines is known except


















above, the a’s are known.
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where the aT’s are defined analogously with the aT-1's, f(sT+1, hmT+1, hfT+1 | H) is the approximation
to the terminal value function, defined in (9), and
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terminal value function parameters. The first two lines are a linear function of the utility
parameters and observed choices and states. Given the nonlinearity of the last line, and a
normalization of one of the utility intercepts, the utility parameters are identified. Given
identification of the utility and health transition parameters, the only remaining unknown
parameters are those of the terminal value function, H. With a nonlinear functional form for the
terminal value function, the H parameters are identified.
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Table 1
Employment Status and Transitions of Husbands and Wives
Wave 1 (1992) Wave 2 (1994)
Percentage of Wives Employed
   Husband Employed 68.1 66.5
   Husband Not Employed 54.2 47.7
   Difference 13.9 18.8
Percentage of Husbands Employed
   Wife Employed 81.2 76.5
   Wife Not Employed 70.6 59.9
   Difference 10.6 16.6
Percentage of wives who exit employment by
1994, of those employed in 1992
   Husband employed in 1992, not in 1994 15.2
   Husband employed in 1992 and 1994 6.5
   Difference 8.7
   Husband not employed in 1992 or 1994 10.6
   Difference from employed in 1992, not in 94 4.6
Percentage of husbands who exit employment
by 1994, of those employed in 1992
   Wife employed in 1992, not in 1994 19.3
   Wife employed in 1992 and 1994 8.5
   Difference 10.8
   Wife not employed in 1992 or 1994 11.5
   Difference from employed in 1992, not in 94 7.8
Sample Size (couples) 2,492 2,492
Source: Tabulations from the HRS. Excludes attriters, individuals with no employer-provided
health insurance, and individuals with more than one type of health insurance.
Table 2
Employment Status and Transitions by Health Insurance Status
Husband’s Health Insurance
Own employer Wife’s employer








1. Hus. employed at wave 1 80.7 96.7 16.0 70.2 78.3 8.1
2. Hus. employed at wave 2 71.8 87.7 15.9 65.3 67.5 2.2
3. Wife employed at wave 1 57.7 57.8 1.0 85.5 94.0 8.5
4. Wife employed at wave 2 54.8 57.2 2.4 77.3 88.0 10.7
5. Hus. exits employment
between wave 1 and 2
11.5 10.5 -1.0 8.3 13.3 5.0
6. Wife exits employment
between wave 1 and 2
7.5 5.7 -1.8 10.3 7.2 -3.1
Sample size 1345 332 242 83
Wife’s Health Insurance









1. Hus. employed at wave 1 67.6 75.3 7.7 74.5 96.8 22.3
2. Hus. employed at wave 2 63.8 67.2 3.4 66.7 86.5 19.8
3. Wife employed at wave 1 86.3 95.5 9.2 52.2 52.7 0.5
4. Wife employed at wave 2 78.2 87.9 9.7 49.3 54.1 4.8
5. Hus. exits employment
between wave 1 and 2
8.1 11.6 3.5 10.6 11.3 0.7
6. Wife exits employment
between wave 1 and 2
10.8 8.1 -2.7 8.2 5.0 -3.2
Sample size 445 198 1203 222
Note: RHI = Retiree Health Insurance
Table 3
Employment Status of the Estimation Sample
Husband Wave 1 Wave 2
   Not employed 30.4 33.3
   Employed: New job 8.6 12.7
   Employed: Same job 61.0 54.0
Wife
   Not employed 45.2 47.3
   Employed: New job 9.6 12.7
   Employed: Same job 45.2 40.0
Joint Distribution
Husband: Not Employed
   Wife: Not employed 17.9 19.6
   Wife: Employed, New job 1.9 3.7
   Wife: Employed, Same job 10.5 9.9
Husband: Employed, new job
   Wife: Not employed 3.9 6.0
   Wife: Employed, New job 1.3 2.0
   Wife: Employed, Same job 3.4 4.5
Husband: Employed, same job
   Wife: Not employed 23.4 21.8
   Wife: Employed, New job 6.4 6.2
   Wife: Employed, Same job 31.3 26.2
Sample size 675 596
Table 4
Distribution of Medical Care in the Estimation Sample
Husband Wife
Category Wave 1 Wave2 Wave 1 Wave 2
Office visits
0     [0] 26.1 16.1 22.8 9.3
1-5  [3] 55.8 49.6 55.3 55.5
6+   [10] 18.1 34.3 21.9 35.2
Mean (sd) 3.9 (7.8) 6.3 (15.3) 4.3 (7.5) 7.4 (17.5)
Hospital nights
0       [0] 87.4 80.4 90.4 84.2
1-3    [2] 5.4 7.4 3.5 6.7
4+     [14] 7.2 12.2 6.1 9.1
Mean (sd) 1.3 (6.4) 2.5 (12.8) 1.1 (9.7) 1.7 (9.0)
Sample 675 644 675 646
Note: Wave 1 data refer to the 12 months prior to the survey date. Wave 2 data refer to the
period between the wave 1 and wave 2 surveys, which is 24 months on average. The numbers in
brackets are the values assigned to the indicated category in the solution of the model. 
Table 5
Health Distribution in the Estimation Sample
Husband Wife
Wave 1: Good 76.1 82.2
   Wave 2: Good    91.3    89.3
   Wave 2: Bad    7.3     10.2
   Wave 2: Dead    1.4      0.6
Wave 1: Bad 23.9 17.8
   Wave 2: Good    21.2    27.8
   Wave 2: Bad    69.0    68.7
   Wave 2: Dead      9.7      3.5
Sample size 648 646
Table 6
Health Insurance Distribution in the Estimation Sample
Husband Wife
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2
None 23.6 22.6 27.1 29.1
Own employer with RHI 31.1 33.8 14.5 18.4
Own employer without RHI 7.7 8.2 5.0 5.9
Spouse employer with RHI 7.7 7.0 24.1 21.8
Spouse employer without RHI 3.8 3.2 6.8 5.0
Private 18.1 13.9 18.6 13.6
Medicare 8.0 11.4 3.8 6.2
Sample Size 675 598 675 598
Note: RHI = Retiree Health Insurance
Table 7: Utility Function Parameter Estimates
Consumption  "1 1.116 (.009) Medical Care effects
b
Intercepts Doctor visits, good health "20,"40 -0.091 (.006)
Hus.     Wife      Hus.   Wife
health   health    empl.  empl.
Doctor visits, bad health "21,"41 0.048 (.004)
good     good     no      no   "00000 .000
a Hospital nights, good health "30,"50 -0.544 (.012)
good     good      no      yes  "00001 -1.096 (.112) Hospital nights, bad health "31,"51 -0.072 (.006)
good     good      yes    no   "00010 1.765 (.122)
good     good      yes     yes "00011 0.746 (.016) Employment effectsb
good     bad       no       no   "00100 -0.045 (.005) Change job, good health "60,"80 -2.243 (.194)
good     bad        no      yes    "00101 -1.524 (.178) Change job, bad health "60,"81 -2.644 (.108)
good     bad        yes     no     "00110 1.586 (.140) Exit empl, good health "71,"90 -2.570 (.129)
good     bad        yes     yes "00111 0.090 (.009) Exit empl, bad health "70,"91 -2.206 (.156)
bad       good      no      no  "01000 0.587 (.050) Age effectsc
bad       good      no      yes "01001 0.031 (.003) Hus., good health, not empl. "10,00 0.875 (.064)
bad       good      yes     no "01010 0.284 (.035) Hus., good health, empl. "10,01 -0.744 (.060)
bad       good      yes     yes  "01011 -0.367 (.050) Hus., bad health, not empl. "10,10 -0.294 (.032)
bad       bad        no      no     "01100 0.208 (.018) Hus., bad health, empl. "10,11 -1.452 (.090)
bad       bad        no      yes    "01101 -1.536 (.160) Wife, good health, not empl. "11,00 .0238 (.022)
bad       bad       yes      no     "01110 -0.505 (.056) Wife, good health, empl. "11,01 -0.087 (.007)
bad       bad       yes      yes     "01111 -2.023 (.176) Wife, bad health, not empl. "11,10 -0.541 (.063)
Wife, bad health, empl. "11,11 -1.116 (.080)
Consumption # 0 "12 -11.121 (.676)
Notes: Asymptotic standard error estimates are in parentheses. Estimated by the BHHH method.
a. Fixed. 
b. Constrained to be equal for husbands and wives.
c. Age is measured as (age-41)/10. 






Not empl. New job Old job Not empl. New job Old job
A P A P A P A P A P A P
All .319 .338 .097 .115 .584 .547 .466 .494 .101 .130 .434 .376
No .767 .771 .232 .229 .829 .794 .171 .205
Yes .136 .162 .043 .068 .821 .770 .145 .228 .039 .064 .816 .708
B. Doctor Visits
Health 0 1-5 6+ 0 1-5 6+
All .279 .414 .566 .341 .155 .245 .225 .421 .588 .343 .187 .237
Good .318 .457 .593 .351 .089 .192 .247 .457 .621 .351 .132 .192
Bad .154 .274 .475 .309 .371 .417 .136 .275 .457 .309 .407 .416
C. Hospital Nights
Health 0 1-3 4+ 0 1-3 4+
All .854 .673 .073 .274 .073 .053 .890 .683 .052 .269 .057 .048
Good .918 .738 .055 .245 .028 .017 .927 .738 .041 .245 .032 .018





H olf W olf H olf W nj H olf W oj H nj W olf H nj W nj H nj W oj
A P A P A P A P A P A P
All .192 .183 .024 .046 .103 .109 .045 .059 .016 .017 .037 .039
Both .036 .045 .004 .013 .080 .105 .008 .019 .004 .005 .022 .044
Neither .730 .646 .064 .132 .142 .171 .064 .051
H oj W olf H oj W nj H oj W oj
All .229 .252 .061 .067 .293 .228
Both .096 .167 .032 .044 .717 .558
Neither
Notes: A = actual; P = predicted; H = husband; W = wife; olf = out of the labor force (not empl);
nj = new job; oj = old job.





Not empl. New job Old job Not empl. New job Old job
A P A P A P A P A P A P
None .375 .356 .143 .145 .482 .499 .632 .592 .136 .167 .232 .240
Own employer,
RHI 
.241 .269 .063 .090 .697 .641 .386 .457 .108 .103 .506 .440
Own employer,
no RHI.
.031 .160 .062 .077 .907 .763 .423 .475 .103 .123 .474 .402
Spouse
employer, RHI




.333 .415 .195 .120 .476 .466 .048 .210 .000 .065 .952 .716
Private .174 .271 .143 .121 .684 .608 .541 .519 .082 .153 .378 .328
Medicare .930 .776 .044 .153 .026 .070 .649 .632 .114 .175 .237 .193
Wife’s health
insurance
Not empl. New job Old job Not empl. New job Old job
A P A P A P A P A P A P
None .425 .402 .142 .140 .434 .458 .625 .596 .142 .167 .233 .236
Own employer,
RHI 
.286 .310 .064 .095 .650 .595 .138 .279 .034 .070 .828 .651
Own employer,
no RHI.
.254 .356 .159 .108 .587 .535 .048 .217 .000 .065 .952 .718
Spouse
employer, RHI




.013 .145 .027 .068 .959 .787 .473 .510 .135 .130 .392 .360
Private .264 .322 .107 .125 .629 .552 .558 .546 .096 .155 .345 .299
Medicare .655 .587 .103 .184 .241 .229 .897 .691 .052 .216 .052 .092
Notes: A = actual; P = predicted.
Table 10: Employment Fit by Health Insurance Category 
Conditional on Previous Period Employment Status
Husband Wife
Not empl. New job Old job Not empl. New job Old job
A P A P A P A P A P A P
Husband’s health insurance Not employed in previous period
Own empl, RHI .789 .786 .210 .214 .791 .826 .209 .174
Own empl, no RHI. .200 .679 .800 .321 .780 .785 .219 .215
Spouse empl, RHI .833 .758 .167 .242 .875 .839 .125 .161
Spou. empl no RHI .625 .785 .375 .215 1.00 .824 .000 .176
Employed in previous period
Own empl, RHI .111 .147 .028 .061 .861 .792 .120 .215 .041 .056 .838 .729
Own empl, no RHI. .022 .132 .022 .063 .956 .805 .161 .247 .018 .056 .821 .697
Spouse empl, RHI .162 .182 .044 .063 .794 .755 .083 .221 .024 .058 .893 .720
Spou. empl no RHI .154 .187 .077 .061 .769 .752 .000 .189 .000 .060 1.00 .751
Wife’s health insurance Not employed in previous period
Own empl, RHI .872 .791 .128 .209 .750 .836 .250 .164
Own empl, no RHI. .556 .785 .444 .215 1.00 .824 .000 .176
Spouse empl, RHI .803 .794 .197 .206 .797 .831 .203 .169
Spou. empl no RHI .000 .785 1.00 .215 .743 .788 .257 .212
Employed in previous period
Own empl, RHI .109 .164 .045 .061 .846 .774 .071 .218 .011 .059 .918 .722
Own empl, no RHI. .133 .184 .044 .066 .822 .750 .016 .198 .000 .061 .984 .741
Spouse empl, RHI .138 .151 .031 .061 .831 .788 .144 .221 .059 .057 .797 .722
Spou. empl no RHI .014 .127 .000 .064 .986 .809 .231 .260 .026 .057 .744 .682
Notes: A = actual; P = predicted.




























Not employed .450 .453 .437 .451 .448 .449 .449
   NE at t-1 .830 .818 .812 .833 .829 .837 .829
   Empl at t-1 .223 .232 .221 .222 .223 .219 .223
Employed .550 .547 .563 .549 .552 .551 .551
   NE at t-1 .170 .182 .187 .167 .171 .163 .171
   Empl at t-1 .777 .768 .779 .778 .777 .781 .777
Wife
Not employed .540 .552 .542 .539 .537 .544 .543
   NE at t-1 .815 .809 .804 .810 .809 .830 .817
   Empl at t-1 .261 .275 .274 .261 .262 .252 .264
Employed .460 .448 .458 .461 .463 .456 .457
   NE at t-1 .185 .191 .196 .190 .191 .170 .182




.264 .268 .251 .267 .263 .275 .268
 Neither empl
 at t-1
.779 .735 .748 .779 .768 .787 .781
Both
employed
.274 .263 .273 .277 .278 .282 .275
 Both Empl at
 t-1




1. Married couples at Wave 1 4,704
2. Age eligible 3,027
3. No missing data on key variables from the HRS survey 2,749
4. With Social Security records for both spouses 1,757
5. With employer-provided health insurance and a HIPPS record
or no employer-provided health insurance
1,349
6. With no missing data from the HIPPS survey  675
Table A-2
Sample Characteristics
Full Sample Estimation Sample
Husband Wife Husband Wife
Age in 1992 57.7 53.5 56.7 53.2
Education 12.1 12.2 12.0 12.0
Black .12 .12 .07 .07
Hispanic .08 .09 .10 .09
Employer health insurance (EHI) .74 .74 .50 .51
Retiree coverage, of those with EHI .80 .79 .77 .77
Employed at the 1992 survey date .726 .609 .696 .548
Hourly wage in 1992 (if employed) 17.99 11.53 16.58 11.25
Pension in 1992 .48 .28 .46 .23
Good health in 1992 .79 .82 .77 .81
Died, divorced, or attrited by 1994 .12 .12 .09 .08
Net worth in 1992 266,150 270,268
Sample size 4,704 675
Table A-3
Health Insurance Characteristics in the Estimation Sample
Husband Wife
% Value % Value
Individual premium (annual) 49 474 50 515
Family premium (annual) 63 1426 65 1397
Retiree premium (annual) 7 2259 7 2296
Deductible for office visits 5 131 5 138
Deductible for all services 60 250 60 256
Maximum annual coverage 65 68361 66 75293
Maximum lifetime coverage 61 1030907 62 1092249
Dollar copayment per office visit 33 10 33 10
Percent copayment per office visit 35 17 36 18
Maximum out-of-pocket cost for office visits 33 1749 34 1745
Copayment per hospital stay 12 133 12 145
Annual copayment for hospital stays 4 522 4 805
Maximum out of pocket cost per hospital stay 2 325 2 325
Annual maximum out of pocket cost for hospital stays 32 1741 34 1688
Sample size 334 337
Note: % = percent of the sample that has a positive value for the characteristic. Value = mean
value of the characteristic in the sub-sample with positive values.
Table A-4
Pension Characteristics in the Estimation Sample
Wave 1 Job Husband Wife
Youngest age at which benefits could be collected 57.7 57.4
Annual Benefit
   If exit job in 1992 13,837 6,854
   If exit job in 1997 15,087 7,966
   If exit job in 2002 18,015 10,152
   If exit job in 2007 21,267 11,149
Sample size 170 108
Previous Job
Youngest age at which benefits could be collected 56.0 59.9
Annual Benefit 11,749 2,987
Sample Size 190 49
Notes: Dollar values are measured in 1992 dollars.
Table A-5
Social Security Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) in the Estimation Sample
Husband Wife
Initial PIA 775 321
PIA after 5 additional years of work 820 377
PIA after 10 additional years of work 851 417
PIA after 15 additional years of work 877 454
Sample size (initial PIA) 672 637
Notes: Initial PIA is the value computed from the Social Security Earnings Record file. The
sample in each row includes only those individuals who are 70 or less after the indicated number
of additional years of work. Dollar values are measured in 1992 dollars.
Table A-6: Health Transition and Other Parameters
Health transition parameters
Hus, good 6 good:   intercept (000 8.06 (2.20) Wife, good 6 good:   intercept (000 9.07 (2.99)
                                 Age (100 -2.29 (1.18)                                  Age (100 -2.77 (1.80)
Hus, good 6 bad:    intercept (001 5.13 (2.30) Wife, good 6 bad:    intercept (001 6.40 (3.03)
                                 Age (101 -2.03 (1.25)                                  Age (101 -2.38 (1.83)
Hus, bad 6 good:    intercept (010 1.45 (1.40) Wife, bad 6 good:    intercept (010 1.39 (1.45)
                                 Age (110 -0.41 (0.84)                                  Age (110 0.58 (1.18)
Hus, bad 6 bad:      intercept (011 2.29 (1.25) Wife, bad 6 bad:      intercept (011 2.53 (1.40)
                                 Age (111 -0.20 (0.73)                                  Age (111 0.39 (1.15)
Other Parameters
Terminal Value Function H 4.536 (.448)
Probability of Divorce . -4.314a
Probability of Layoff * -3.892a
Discount Factor $ .925a
Notes: a. Fixed. Probability of divorce is e./(1+e.). Probability of layoff is e*/(1+e*). Terminal
value function is -eH. Age is measured as (age-41)/10. Standard errors are in parentheses.
